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I. INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY
This article presents and compares data collected in Argentina and the
United States during each country's initial experience with court-connected
mediation. An analysis of these data yields a case study on the beginning of
two mandatory mediation experiences at the national level that will prove
useful to countries contemplating the adoption of mediation laws or the
reformation of existing ones.
Mediation, one of various "Alternative Dispute Resolution" (ADR)
practices, has long been employed in societies around the world. In many
countries today, ADR practices represent an alternative to litigation and,
more generally, to adversarial ideology. Yet, this truism is coming into
question. In the last twenty-five years, mediation has become a mainstream
practice in the United States and, more recently, in Latin America, and in
many cases is the first mode of dispute processing to be applied.
In the period between 1990 and 1999, Argentina and the United States
began their experience with court-connected mediation and achieved not-
able results. Comparing these initial experiences is essential to gaining a
clear view of what problems and advantages stem from the particular con-
tours of each country's approach to court-connected mediation. In addition
to insights derived from this comparison, however, this article uncovers
surprising facts about the practical effects of mandatory mediation. For
example, the data on settlement rates and administrative costs suggest that
the courts-that is, the government-in each country save money through
the operation of the mandatory mediation laws, but that this benefit to the
courts comes at a financial and temporal cost to the majority of disputants.
The comparison undertaken in this article is functionalist in that it
notes that mediation, although different in each country, serves similar
purposes in each. But the primary, proclaimed function of a thing is often
-and mediation is no exception-just one of many other functions.
Accordingly, the comparison undertaken here is wide-reaching. It begins
by analyzing mediation on paper-the rationales for mandatory mediation
and the laws that provide for its institutionalization. Then, the analysis
turns to mediation's effects in practice. This Article concludes with a dis-
cussion of larger issues affected by mediation, such as market liberalization
and power dynamics between social classes. Consequently, the variables
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compared fall on varying levels of abstraction, starting with each law's
purpose and textual characteristics, passing through their direct effects, and
finishing with macro change.
There are two points of departure for this comparison:' a tangible
legal development common to both countries and an ideal or abstraction,
also common to both countries, which motivated this development and
continues to draw support for it. With regard to the former, both countries
have passed federal laws that authorize mandatory mediation for a variety
of cases. With regard to the latter, proponents of the laws and of mediation
in both countries have made broad claims regarding its virtues, claims that
elucidate particular views of efficiency and legal culture.
A key difference between the two countries lies in the fact that
mediation developed organically within the United States, but only via
transplantation in Argentina. Thus, in Argentina, complexity arises not
only from the presence of a challenge to the litigation paradigm, but also
from the fact that this challenge emanated from abroad. The challenge
posed by mediation to the litigation paradigm is, however, the primary
phenomenon to be analyzed. Although mediation was transplanted to
Argentina, the larger and more profound transplant is that which has been
effected upon the court system. A consensual and participatory dispute
processing mechanism was implemented alongside its older, more authori-
tative brother. The purpose of this comparison is to elucidate not only the
immediate effects of mediation, but also the greater significance and
unintended consequences of its implementation in two very different
countries.
The research leading up to this Article consisted of both fieldwork and
a review of pre-existing data. I gathered data on mediation practice in the
Argentine Federal Capital, Buenos Aires,2 during a six-month field study in
1998-1999, the time period during which the initial data set on the media-
tion laws was emerging.3  During this time, I conducted thirty semi-
structured interviews with lawyers, social scientists, Ministry of Justice
I. These form the tertium comparationis for my study. See John C. Reitz, How to Do
Comparative Law, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 617, 622 (1998) (discussing the importance of a common point of
departure).
2. Until very recently, almost all mediation activity in Argentina was concentrated in the
Federal Capital of Buenos Aires, a city with three million inhabitants. The name "Buenos Aires"
sometimes includes the urban area that contains an additional 8 million people immediately beyond the
Federal Capital's limit. For the purposes of this article, "Buenos Aires" refers only to the Federal
Capital and its three million people.
3. This research was made possible by a fellowship awarded to me by the Thomas J. Watson
Foundation, which enabled me to investigate first-hand the use of consensual dispute resolution
practices in Argentina, Ecuador, and Costa Rica.
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personnel, and mediators and observed 20 court-mandated mediations in
Buenos Aires. All translations of Argentine legal texts and commentary are
my own.4 For data on mediation practice in the United States, I have relied
mostly on studies conducted by RAND.5 My analysis of the data from
these studies is, however, original.
II. MEDIATION DESIGN: QUESTIONS OF THEORY
AND INITIAL IMPLEMENTATION
From the standpoint of legal transplant postulates, 6 the great irony of
mediation is that it is not intended to "accord with the dominant ideology in
host countries.",7  Rather, it is intended to change the dominant ideology
responsible for a population's propensity to litigate. The mediation institu-
tion in both countries encourages bargaining among' parties to a lawsuit
with the express goal of achieving settlement without incurring the financial
and temporal costs associated with litigation. When exported to a country
without mediation experience, however, a double change occurs: first, a
change in legal procedure resulting from the mere fact of a transplant and,
second, deeper changes promoted by the operation of the new law. This
trajectory towards deeper change transcends the immediate importance of
the new mediation procedures.
A. Mediation in Theory
It is said that legal culture "encompasses the epistemological assump-
tions regarding rationality, efficiency, and merit" and that these assump-
tions are "historically conditioned and deeply rooted ... influenc[ing] the
4. This task has not been difficult, since a highly technical vocabulary is employed in the
legal texts. Still, I have tried to minimize the risks associated with wholly literal translations. See
MARGOT ASTROV, AMERICAN INDIAN PROSE AND POETRY 5 (Capricorn books 1962). ("Wholly literal
translations would do little justice to the original .... In some way or other the translator has to
translate not only the actual words of a myth, tale, or a song, but also the cultural matrix of which the
verbal document to be translated is an organic part." Id.)
5. RAND Corporation, at http://www.rand.org/index.html (last visited May 23, 2005).
6. It is unclear, contrary to Esin Oricio's assertion, that "transplant" is an inaccurate term,
since the "transplanted institution continues to live on in its old habitat as well as having been moved to
a new one .. " Esin Oricii, Law as Transposition, 51 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 205, 205 (2002). One can
clip and transplant a section of a spider plant in a new locale without the original plant ceasing to exist.
Cf. id.
7. John Gillespie, Transplanted Company Law: An Ideological and Cultural Analysis of
Market-Entry in Vietnam, 51 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 641, 645 (2002) (describing one of the "working
postulates" synthesized from Otto Kahn-Freund: "Legal Ideology: Transplanted laws should accord
with the dominant ideology in host countries").
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way bureaucrats and judges use law to find reality."8 Although apparent in
this quotation, it should be specified that legal culture encompasses and
conditions a society's notion(s) of justice. Mediation theory explicitly
challenges these notions in Argentina and the United States.
Mediation has a relatively stable, agreed-upon meaning in both
countries studied.9 It is considered a consensual dispute resolution practice
in which a third-party with some claim to neutrality facilitates the negotia-
tion, and perhaps resolution, of an issue between two or more parties.
Mediation is considered less adversarial than litigation since-unlike
litigation-no assumption is made that the parties cannot come to a
mutually agreeable solution. Admittedly, mediations are often adversarial
in flavor, but at the very least mediation does not posit a zero-sum game, as
does litigation where it can generally be said that someone wins and
someone loses. Indeed, mediators encourage parties to communicate,
understand each other's interests, and work together to solve a shared
problem; however, deals may also be reached in an adversarial fashion
through 'hard bargaining.' In either case, it is agreed that mediation proce-
dures are "far less structured and more flexible than those of courts and of
arbitration."' 0  Thus, parties can exert great control over the mediation
process and 'take ownership' of their dispute.
Similarly, mediation is considered consensual, since the mediator can-
not bind the parties to a particular result. In fact, the parties must agree to a
resolution before it can be adopted and become binding. This feature
distinguishes mediation from adjudication or arbitration where the third
party, here a judge or arbitrator, issues a ruling that the parties must
8. Id. at 645.
9. Argentine and U.S. writers agree on the definition of mediation. Regarding the former, see
ENRIQUE M. FALC6N, MEDIACI6N OBLIGATORIA EN LA LEY 24.573 [OBLIGATORY MEDIATION IN THE
LAW 24.573], at 9-18 (Abeledo-Perrot 1996) (citing "voluntariness" as among the "elemental rules of
mediation" and noting the general definition of mediation to be "a non-adversarial proceeding in which
a neutral third party without power over the parties cooperatively helps the parties to find the point of
harmony in the conflict"); JUAN PEDRO COLEIRO & JORGE A. ROJAS, MEDIACI6N OBLIGATORIA Y
AUDIENCIA PRELIMINAR [OBLIGATORY MEDIATION AND THE PRELIMINARY AUDIENCE] 10-11
(Rubinzal & Culzoni 1998) ("mediation is a type of negotiation in which a third party does not offer
solutions; rather, the mediator works with the parties' interests [as opposed to positions] so that the
parties can consensually and voluntarily reach an agreement"). Regarding the latter, see, e.g., SARAH R.
COLE ET AL., MEDIATION: LAW, POLICY, PRACTICE § 1:1 (West 2003) ("Mediators are 'third parties,'
not otherwise involved in a controversy, who assist disputing parties in their negotiations ... mediation
[can be distinguished from other dispute resolution processes] by the consensual character of its
disposition .... Although sometimes the parties are compelled to participate in mediation and may be
pressured toward settlement, any party nonetheless may choose not to settle and may pursue other
remedies").
10. COLE ET AL., supra note 9, at§ 1:1.
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follow." Although parties may be forced by law to appear at the mediation
session, they cannot-at least in theory-be forced to reach a resolution. It
is the requirement of participating in the session that renders such mediation
obligatory. Finally, several different schools of mediation exist, including:
directive (where the mediator pushes towards settlement and often suggests
or evaluates ideas for settlement); facilitative (where the mediator tries to
maintain the communication flow and build a relationship between the
parties, but is neutral regarding settlement); and transformative (where the
mediator attempts to help parties become empowered and more empathetic,
thereby transforming the conflict into an opportunity for personal growth). 12
The context in which mediation occurs and the incentives operating in
that context will determine what type of mediation is practiced. This
practice is not an objective act, since people's perceptions of the act shape
the meaning the act acquires. In this regard, a historical note on each
country is required to elucidate the cultural starting point and political
process from which mediation has been institutionalized.
B. Mediation in Context: History and the Transplantation Process
Mediation in the United States, as a formal legal practice on the federal
level, was first implemented by Congress in 1898 to address conflicts
between organized labor and management. 3 Several federal agencies were
created to address such disputes throughout the first half of the twentieth
century, contemporaneous with varied state initiatives applying mediation
to non-labor issues.14 Throughout the entire twentieth century, mediation
manifested in many forms and contexts, including conciliation in domestic
relations courts, 5 mediation of civil rights disputes, community mediation,
and finally in the federal courts starting in the 1970s.1
6
1t. This statement is made for simplicity's sake. It is true, of course, that arbitration can be
custom designed in any way that does not violate an applicable law, meaning that some arbitrations may
contain rules that may limit the discretion of the arbitrator to a certain universe of outcomes agreed to in
advance by the parties. If an arbitrator's decision is non-binding, however, then the process ceases to be
arbitration and becomes a form of third party evaluation, a distinct type of dispute resolution.
12. See, e.g., ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION
(Jossey-Bass Publishers 1994).
13. COLE ET AL., supra note 9, at § 5:1-5:4.
14. Id. at § 5:1.
15. Conciliation is identical to mediation, except that the mediator is generally considered to
play a more active role in suggesting outcomes. See id at § 1:1.
16. See id. at § 5:1-5:2 (discussing each of these developments); Judge Dorothy Wright
Nelson, ADR in the Federal Courts-One Judge's Perspective: Issues and Challenges Facing Judges,
Lawyers, Court Administrators, and the Public, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1 (2001) (describing the
early stages of federal court ADR).
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Argentina did not experiment with mediation throughout the twentieth
century. Rather, it experimented with radically different forms of govern-
ment. A conflict between social models raged, as radically different
administrations, including those of moderate administrations, Juan
Domingo Per6n, and the various military coups, looked to institute models
of government consistent with their views. 17 Basic juxtapositions in this
period were those constructed (and tested) between military versus civilian
rule, non-violent versus violent methods of social change, and socialist
versus capitalist models for structuring society. The most recent military
dictatorship, which reigned from 1976-1983, attempted to put an end to
these debates and to establish an orderly state of affairs where absolute
power abided in the hands of a few military generals. This power found
expression in the "dirty war," which levied the disappearance and murder of
roughly 20,000-30,000 Argentines, and the torture and political persecution
of countless more.'
8
When military rule ended in 1983, the tides of globalization washed
over Argentina and modernization of the legal system entered the political
agenda. In the period between 1987 and 1989, only five years after the
return of democracy, news of alternative dispute resolution in the United
States began to enter Argentina via academic journals.
Beginning around 1990, Argentine lawyers and judges traveled to the
United States to receive training in mediation and import it to their country.
A steady stream of United States mediation experts, most of whom praising
mediation's utility for reducing court case loads, began to flow into Buenos
Aires. Numerous training sessions were carried out and from all of this
emerged the first pool of local experts, almost all of whom were lawyers
with a court-connected vision for mediation's future. The Argentine federal
government expressed a strong interest in mediation, as did the Agency for
International Development (AID). Money came in and the National
Argentine Mediation Plan was set in motion in Buenos Aires with the intent
of institutionalizing mediation. The Ministry of Justice sponsored training
sessions within its affiliated public and private institutions in which no one
besides lawyers and psychologists were allowed to participate and created a
list of official mediators, the only ones permitted to mediate. Approxi-
mately four thousand people were trained as mediators and this constituted
a business opportunity for both lawyers and newly emerged training
17. See generally LUIS ALBERTO ROMERO, BREVE HISTORIA CONTEMPORANEA DE
ARGENTINA [A BRIEF CONTEMPORARY HISTORY OF ARGENTINA] (Fondo de Cultura Econ6mica [Econ.
Culture Fund] 1994).
18. See KENNETH T. RIVERA, ARGENTINA: ISSUES, HISTORY, BIBLIOGRAPHY 48 (Nova Sci.
Publishers 2002).
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institutes.' 9 In 1993, a two-year trial period went into effect during which
ten courts referred select cases to mediation. The Ministry of Justice
recorded a settlement rate of approximately fifty percent and realized that
mediation could indeed decrease the case flow.
Profound dissimilarities present themselves on all fronts in these brief
comments on each country's history with dispute resolution. The largest
difference relates to the social history of instability and the still recent
killing of tens of thousands of people in Argentina.2 ° Violence and social
unrest occupy the opposite end of the spectrum from mediation and other
non-violent, conciliatory modes of social change. As a participative
process that gives decision-making powers to citizens, mediation contrasts
starkly with the political and psychological rubble of military rule. An
unstable history with little citizen control over daily affairs raises the
potential for path dependency that would make the participatory and con-
sensual mediation process incongruous, even outside of the legal sphere.
Two further dissimilarities derive from legal history, and concern the
relative speeds with which mediation developed in each country and the
nature of that development-organic in one country via transplantation in
the other. Mediation developed organically in the United States, cul-
minating in general federal laws after seventy years of experience, whereas
Argentine mediation crossed the distance between non-existence and
significant institutionalization in roughly five years. Aside from the host of
issues this raises for the capacity of legal institutions to support it and
citizens to engage in it, mediation's arrival on the wings of a foreign power
triggers concerns about imperialism and self-determination. As legal
reform in Argentina has often been coordinated through multilateral
financial institutions, such as the World Bank and the AID, it is associated
with controversial "neo-liberal" economic policies.2' Valid concerns in this
area are discussed in Section V. For now, it should be noted that mandatory
mediation in Argentina is far more imposing and sudden than its United
States counterpart and that this raises concerns over path dependency and a
19. Interview with Miguel Gaya, arbitrator, mediator and member of the Confederaci6n
Econ6mica de Argentina [Economic Confederation of Argentina] (Oct., 1998).
20. Although the United States of course has an extremely bloody history (consider the
Revolution, the Civil War, the Native American genocide, and Hiroshima) it has not directed its military
force inward in recent times and has never killed 25,000 of its own citizens, except in civil warfare,
which must be distinguished from military rule and torture chambers. Those killed in Argentina were
every-day people of an anti-fascist ideology and perhaps some connection to social organizing.
21. See generally DANIEL MUCHNIK, ARGENTINA MODELO: DE LA FURIA A LA RESIGNAC16N:
ECONOMtA Y POLITICA ENTRE 1973 Y 1998 (CUADERNOS ARGENTINOS) [ARGENTINIAN MODEL: FROM
THE FURY TO RESIGNATION: ECONOMY AND POLITICS BETWEEN 1973 AND 1998 (ARGENTINE
NOTEBOOKS)] (Manantial 1998) (detailing the historical sentiments regarding economic and political
changes from 1973 to 1998).
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corresponding hesitancy or inability to engage in consensual, participatory
conflict resolution modes. As the following Section illustrates, however,
Argentina's laws mandate mediation in a more categorical fashion than the
equivalent laws in the United States. This can be seen as a logical choice
by legislators, in light of the population's relative unpreparedness to choose
mediation voluntarily.
III. MEDIATION AS INSTITUTIONALIZED BY FEDERAL LAW
A. The Laws and Their Rationales
In 1990, the United States Congress passed the Civil Justice Reform
Act ("CJRA").22 It states that each United States District Court "shall
consider . . . principles and guidelines of litigation management and cost
and delay reduction," 23 and allows the District Courts ". . . to refer
appropriate cases to alternative dispute resolution programs ... including
mediation., 24 Congress made several findings justifying the law:
1) [C]ost and delay in civil litigation in any United States district
court must be addressed in ... both civil and criminal matters;
and,
2) [T]he courts, the litigants, the litigants' attorneys, and the
Congress and the executive branch, share responsibility for cost
and delay in civil litigation and its impact on access to the courts,
adjudication of cases on the merits, and the ability of the civil
justice system to provide proper and timely judicial relief for
aggrieved parties; and,
3) [S]olutions... must include.., contributions by the courts,
the litigants, the litigants' attorneys .... 25
In short time, the United States Congress passed the Alternative
Dispute Resolution Act of 1998 ("ADR Act"),26 making a series of findings
and ordering each District Court to authorize the use of alternative dispute
resolution processes. Congress asserted that:
[A]ltemative dispute resolution . . . has the potential to pro-
vide.., greater satisfaction of the parties, innovative methods of
resolving disputes, and greater efficiency in achieving settlements
22. Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650 § 101, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990).
23. Civil Justice Reform Act § 473(a).
24. Civil Justice Reform Act § 473(a)(6).
25. Civil Justice Reform Act § 102(1-3).
26. Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-315 § 1, 112 Stat. 2993
(1998).
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•.. [and] certain forms of alternative dispute resolution... may
have potential to reduce the large backlog of cases now pending
in some Federal courts throughout the United States, ... allowing
the courts to process their .. cases more efficiently.
27
Congress concluded that "mediation had shown special promise and should
be considered, in particular, for inclusion in each district's ADR pro-
gram."
28
In 1995, the Argentine Legislature enacted the "Mediation and
Conciliation Law," 29 which requires almost all types of litigants in the
Federal Capital of Buenos Aires to attend mediation. Among the greatest
official rationales for the passage of this law were:
1) The exorbitant quantity of cases that, in continual increase,
threaten to collapse the legal system; and,
2) To change the litigious culture; and,
3) The inability of the state to provide justice.
The law states in article 1 that mandatory mediation will "promote
direct communication between the parts for the extra-judicial solution of the
controversy."
31
The following year, the Argentine Legislature put into effect the
"Obligatory Labor Conciliation Instance Law" 32 in the Federal Capital, this
time to mandate mediation for labor and employment disputes.33
Both countries have premised their mediation laws on the need to
relieve the negative effects of high caseloads on the courts. The United
States laws specifically reference high costs and delays and that ADR can
27. Alternative Dispute Resolution Act § 2(1-3).
28. Alternative Dispute Resolution Act § 2(3) ("the continued growth of Federal appellate
court-annexed mediation programs suggests that this form of alternative dispute resolution can be
equally effective in resolving disputes in the Federal trial courts; therefore, the district courts should
consider including mediation in their local alternative dispute resolution programs").
29. Ley de Mediaci6n y Conciliaci6n [Mediation and Conciliation Law], Law No. 24.573,
Oct. 25, 1995, [28258] Boletin Oficial [B.O.] 1 (Arg.).
30. See SENATOR BRANDA, LA LEY, ANTECEDENTES PARLAMENTARIOS [THE LAW,
PARLIAMENTARY ANTECEDENTS] 259, 267 (1995) (the third rationale is attributed to Representatives
Duraflona and Vedia; id. at 315), cited in FALCON, supra note 9, at 13.
31. Mediation and Conciliation Law, art. I.
32. Ley de Instancia Obligatoria de Conciliaci6n Laboral [Obligatory Labor Conciliation
Law], Law No. 24.635, Apr. 26, 1996, [28387] B.O. I (Arg.).
33. The difference between mediation and conciliation is theoretical. It is thought that the
conciliator has greater leeway than a mediator to suggest solutions and apply pressure to the parties. See
COLEIRO & ROJAS, supra note 9.
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solve these problems. Only the Argentine rationale refers to the goal of
changing legal culture, while only the second United States law claims
substantive advantages to ADR, those that go beyond its efficiency-such
as party satisfaction and innovations. Finally, the first United States law
explicitly assigns responsibility for the courts' problems to the other two
branches of government, as well as to the parties and their lawyers. Still,
each country's rationales are substantially similar.
B. Institutionalization-Degrees of Compulsion and Centralization
Both Argentine laws mandate categorical attendance at mediation.
Article 1 of the mediation law states that mediation "of obligatory character
• . .[shall] precede all adjudication." 34 Article two excludes various types
of cases from the law's reach,35 including claims controlled by the Ministry
of Labor.36 Such claims involve labor disputes that are subject to the broad
scope of the conciliation law: "All individual or group claims involving a
conflict of law within the jurisdiction of the National Labor Commission,
prior to being filed as a lawsuit, are obligated to pass before the
administrative agency created by this law."3 7 Thus, mediation is mandatory
and applies to most types of civil cases.
In the United States, the ADR Act does not mandate mediation, but
rather requires that District Courts offer ADR: "Each United States district
court shall authorize, [not "mandate"] by local rule adopted under section
2071(a), the use of alternative dispute resolution processes in all civil
actions.,,38 Each of the ninety-four District Courts, however, may mandate
mediation via their local rules.39 The Law further authorizes each Court to
exempt "specific cases or categories of cases in which use of alternative
dispute resolution would not be appropriate," but requires that they consult
a member of the bar including the United States attorney for their district.
40
Thus, most everything is left to the District Courts' discretion, except
34. Mediation and Conciliation Law, art. 1.
35. Among the cases per se excluded are: criminal; divorce, separation, and other family-
related proceedings; those in which the state or any of its decentralized entities is a party; habeas corpus
and other challenges to the legality of detention; and inheritance claims. Mediation and Conciliation
Law, art. 2.
36. Mediation and Conciliation Law, art. 2 (1-10).
37. Obligatory Labor Conciliation Law, art. 1. The agency in question, the Obligatory Labor
Conciliation Service, is named in article 4.
38. Alternative Dispute Resolution Act § 3(b).
39. Alternative Dispute Resolution Act § 4(a) ("Any district court that elects to require the use
of alternative dispute resolution in certain cases may do so only with respect to mediation, early neutral
evaluation, and, if the parties consent, arbitration").
40. Alternative Dispute Resolution Act § 4(b).
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whether or not they offer ADR at the outset. Over half of all districts
offered mediation prior to 1998, 4' indicating that the ADR Act may have
relatively little effect on mediation beyond that already obtained by the
CJRA. As of 1999, "mediation programs [were] the most.., frequently
authorized ADR program. Nearly eighty district courts have authorized or
established at least one court-wide ADR program.,4 2  The level of
compulsion placed on litigants, therefore, depends on the local rules in each
district.
Accordingly, four districts that employ mediation will be examined-
the Southern District of New York ("NY"), Eastern District of Pennsylvania
("PA"), Western District of Oklahoma ("OK"), and Southern District of
Texas ("TX"). At the time, PA mandated mediation categorically, while the
other three districts allowed for mandatory referrals with varying degrees of
input from the judge assigned to the case, the parties, and an ADR
administrator. This sample produces data on a mix of mediation program
types, which increases its representativeness.43 These programs may have
been modified since 1996, when the data were finalized. Nevertheless, the
data remain useful for analyzing the beginning of mandatory mediation in
the United States and the scope of local variations under the applicable
federal laws.
Half of all civil cases filed in PA are randomly selected for mediation,
with a number of exceptions.44 One exception includes any case that a
judge determines to be unsuitable for mediation.45 In NY, mandatory
referral to mediation is permitted in cases involving no issue besides
liability for damages.46 The judge and a staff attorney review the case and
discuss mediation with the parties during an initial conference.47 Parties
41. See ELIZABETH PLAPINGER & DONNA STIENSTRA, FED. JUD. CTR. [FJC], ADR AND
SETTLEMENT IN THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: A SOURCEBOOK FOR JUDGES & LAWYERS 4 (1996), a
joint project of the Federal Judicial Center and the CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution, available at
http://www.fjc.gov/public/home.nsf/autoframe?openform&urlr=pages/556&url-l=index.
42. New Law Authorizes ADR In All District Courts, 31 THE THIRD BRANCH, No. 2, Feb.
1999, at http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/feb99ttb/newlaw.htmi.
43. Although the precise ratio of mandatory to optional mediation in all the districts is
unknown, it is known that both types exist. Accordingly, the sample I have selected is more
representative of court-connected mediation in the United States than an all-voluntary or all-mandatory
sample. The data are dated, however, having been collected from 1992 to 1995. More recent statistical
data concerning the use of mediation by district courts could not be found.
44. See PLAPINGER & STIENSTRA, supra note 41 at 241 (detailing types of cases excluded from
mediation, including "Social Security cases, cases in which a prisoner is a party ... asbestos cases, or
any case a judge determines is not suitable for mediation").
45. Id.
46. Id. at 199.
47. Id.
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may make an ad hoc appeal to the court for exclusion from mediation.48
Such an appeal is unnecessary in the OK program where, despite mandatory
referral power, referrals typically require the consent of all parties.49 This
consent can be given at the pretrial scheduling conference where the judge,
ADR administrator and counsel "discuss whether mediation is appropriate
for the case. 5° In TX, lawyers on both sides are required to discuss ADR
with their clients and each other before the initial scheduling conference. 5'
Parties then inform the court of the results of this discussion, at which time
the assigning judge may require that the case be mediated.52 Parties are
permitted to request a referral to mediation.53
1. Is mediation still part of "Alternative" Dispute Resolution?
Both countries' federal laws are fundamentally similar, in that they
formally institutionalize mediation into the justice system and allow for
mandatory attendance. Mediation now operates alongside litigation as a
mechanism through which the state resolves the conflicts brought by its
citizens. A kind of mixed judicial system now exists in Argentina and the
United States. Accordingly, mediation hardly deserves to be included in the
ADR grouping due to the inaccuracy of the word "alternative" as applied to
it. It is now an alternative only in the sense that it is used instead of some-
thing else, not because its usage takes the conflict to an informal domain
outside the realm of state power. Moreover, in Buenos Aires and those
United States districts mandating mediation, it is not "alternative" at all, but
rather the dominant mode of dispute processing for many types of cases.
Accordingly, for those cases selected for mediation, litigation now plays the
role of an alternative dispute resolution mechanism.
Despite mediation's dominance, a sliding scale of compulsion is
evident in the various case selection processes employed. The first type of
rule can be termed 'mediation by legislative fiat.' Argentina has established
a categorically obligatory rule that leaves no discretion to judges, parties, or
administrators. 54  The second-most compulsory rule presumes that
mediation will occur, but allows for opt-out by the judge and can be termed
'presumption with judicial opt-out.' In this sense, the PA rule comes close
to Argentina's degree of across-the-board compulsion, but allows the
48. Id.
49. PLAPINGER & STIENSTRA, supra note 41, at 234.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 271.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Part of its categorical nature lies in specifying ex ante which cases shall not be mediated.
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assigned judge to remove a case at her own discretion. Finally, the
mediation procedures in NY, OK, and TX establish a rule of "consultation
before mediation," yet all districts maintain mandatory referral power.
Thus, each district consults with the parties and their attorneys regarding
the suitability of their case for mediation, but may in the end require media-
tion, despite objections. If, in practice, judges in NY, OK, and TX routinely
mandated mediation over objections by the parties and their lawyers, the
resulting rule might be labeled "mediation by judicial fiat," rather than
consultative. The various rules differ most in terms of the degree to which
they allow the parties and their lawyers to influence the type of process to
which their cases will be subjected. Those that allow for greatest party
input are the most consensual, and, non-trivially, maintain greatest consis-
tency with mediation theory.
2. On the likelihood of cultural acceptance
The establishment of a mixed system via compulsion raises concerns
over fairness, justice, and popular perception. These concerns are least
acute in the United States where mediation has not only a long history, but
also a decentralized implementation process that allows for input by parties
and lawyers. At the very least, parties have a chance to be heard in three of
the four sampled United States programs before mediation is mandated for
their case. But in Argentina, where the legal and social culture can be
expected to be least accustomed to or, in the worst of cases, least
welcoming of mediation, parties have no chance to be heard. This is essen-
tially a catch-twenty-two, in that not having a chance to be heard is in fact
consistent with Argentine legal culture. Still, the fact that mediation is of
foreign pedigree and was established with significant input from foreign
experts and multilateral financial institutions bodes against acceptance by
Argentine social culture, in which foreign influence is almost universally
thought to be self-interested and historically unjust.55 Additionally,
Argentines distrust their own elites who, as a social class, are infamously
corrupt.
5 6
55. See, e.g., EDUARDO GALEANO, LAS VENAS ABIERTAS DE AMIRICA LATINA [THE OPEN
VEINS OF LATIN AMERICA] (1974). During the recent economic collapse in Argentina, even members of
the World Bank and International Monetary Fund [IMF] decried their institutions' application of
standard recipes without care for local conditions.
56. This statement would be a proper subject of "judicial notice," as there are few more
obvious elements of Argentine culture. For example, mere mention of Carlos Menem, who served as
President during the 1990s, will trigger the word "robber" in almost every local response. Moreover,
that response would be technically correct. See, e.g., Uki Goni, Menem Bows Out of Race for Top Job,
GUARDIAN UNLIMITED, May 15, 2003, at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/argentina/story/O,l 1439,956213,00.html (describing the current president's
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That notwithstanding, Gladys Alvarez and Elena Highton, two judges
instrumental in the importation of mediation from the United States and the
design of the mediation law, predicted that mediation's virtues would breed
acceptance in the populace: "[W]hen the people of Argentina comprehend
what mediation is . . . [evidently] it will no longer be necessary for
mediation to be obligatory; rather it will be voluntary., 57 The same idea
was espoused by a significant figure behind mediation in the United States:
"'I believe there is a clear distinction between coercion into mediation and
coercion in mediation .. .[T]he former, in my view, is .. .a temporary
solution for the problem created by the fact that when people use mediation,
they are very pleased with it ... but because our system is so court-and
adjudication-oriented, people do not know about the benefits of mediation
and hence do not use it enough voluntarily.'" 5 8 The comments of influential
mediation advocates from both countries evince a faith in the process of
mediation itself, in its value and the likelihood that people in each country
will perceive that value. Thus, both arguments take a paternalistic form,
advocating not only the desirability of top-down legal change, but also the
inevitability that people will come to their senses once forced to behave in
the desired fashion.
The following Section evaluates whether either type of rationale for
mandatory mediation-principally, efficiency and changing legal culture-
are achieved in practice. Further, the use of numerical data allows for a
view of what other effects are achieved.
IV. MEDIATION IN PRACTICE: INCENTIVES AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES
Both countries' laws were intended to ease court dockets and promote
efficiency in dispute processing. This Section shows that both countries
have achieved these objectives in a narrow sense. They have diverted a
significant number of cases from the adjudicatory path. However, effi-
ciency is an insufficiently disaggregated concept. Any definition of effi-
ciency contains implicit assumptions. Accordingly, it must be asked, "For
whom is the law efficient?" and "For what specific purpose (or values) is
the law efficient?" This Section shows that mediation changes the balance
of power between disputants and is efficient for the courts. What follows is
a commentary on what type of efficiency is achieved, how it is achieved,
statement that "big business ... had 'devastated' the country under Mr. Menem's corrupt 10-year
presidency...").
57. Elena I. Highton & Gladys S. dvarez, Mdtodos RAD-La Mediaci6n Obligatoria en la
Ley 24.573 [ADR Methods-The Obligatory Mediation in the 24.573 Law], LBRA No. 6, at 14 (Spring
1997).
58. Frank E. Sander et al., Judicial (Mis)Use ofADR? A Debate, 27 U. TOL. L. REV. 885, 886
(1996).
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and what immediate unintended consequences flow from achieving
efficiency in this manner.
A. One Type of Efficiency-Serving the Courts
Recall the degree to which the justification for mandatory mediation in
both countries hinged almost entirely on reducing court costs and delay. 9
Though statistics are unavailable for Argentina, studies on United States
districts dispute the claim that court costs and delay were acute in the period
in which Congress made its initial findings regarding the bulging court
docket. First even as of 1990, nearly ninety-five percent of civil cases filed
in federal court settled before trial.6° Second, the number of civil and
criminal cases filed each year in federal court decreased by 36,000 from
1985 to 1993.6 Third, and most telling for legislative rationales of judicial
overcrowding, the number of cases per federal judge per year has declined
62even more sharply in the same period, moving from 476 to 354. The
decrease in the number of trials per judge has also been significant, falling
from the upper forties in the 1970s to thirty-one in 1992.63 Finally, in terms
of court delay, the "average time from filing to disposition" decreased from
nine to eight months in the same period.64
Assuming Congress was aware of these statistics, then the word
"costs" should be emphasized in assessing its support for mediation on the
basis that "costs and delay ... must be addressed., 65 Similarly, Argentine
legislative history referenced an "exorbitant quantity of cases that, in con-
tinual increase, threaten to collapse the legal system., 66  The proximate
cause of any such collapse would ultimately be monetary in nature. Other-
wise, why not hire more judges and build more courtrooms? As is shown
below, both countries' mediation laws succeed in diverting cases and saving
money for the state.
59. See Section HIA, supra.
60. Ellen J. Pollack & Edward Felsenthal, Private Civil Cases in Federal Courts Rarely Reach
Trial, WALL ST. J., June 27, 1990, at B2.
61. Sander et al., supra note 58, at 889.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id
65. See Civil Justice Reform Act § 102(1).
66. See FALC6N, supra note 9, at 13 citing BRANDA, supra note 30.
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1. Settlement rates under the mediation laws
In April of 1995, the Argentine mediation law went into effect.
Between then and October of 1998, 103,421 cases were presented for
mediation at the Ministry of Justice, the regulatory authority in this
matter.67 The total number of cases mediated in this 3.5-year time period
was 69,275. Of these 69,275 cases, 29,951 (43%) reached a mediated
settlement and 39,324 (57%) did not. The larger statistic is that 29% of the
total cases diverted from the court and presented at the Ministry of Justice
were resolved in mediation (29,951 cases settled out of 103,421 pre-
sented).68 The conciliation law resulted in essentially the same settlement
rate: 31%, or 10,677 cases settled of the 34,887 mediated from 1997-
1998.69
Higher settlement rates were obtained in the United States, ranging
from 21%-60% in the four United States districts surveyed. 70  The average
of these four rates is 47%.7 1 That minority of litigants who settle in media-
tion do not appear to save money or time. In two of the four mediation
programs studied, mediation caused an increase in lawyer work hours
(twenty-five hours in one program and fifteen hours in the other) as
67. Of the total number of cases presented, 34,146 cases (33% of the total) were not mediated
due mainly to absence of the defendant (17,015 cases) and difficulty of notifying the parties of the
mediation session (9,417 cases). Other reasons for the failure of these obligatory proceedings to take
place were absence of the plaintiff (1,785 cases), decision of the plaintiff or defendant to not participate
(1,405 and 1,539 cases, respectively), and absence of legal counsel for the parties (421 cases). The
statistics up until this point come from MINISTERIO DE JUSTICIA, DIRECCION NACIONAL DE MEDIOS
ALTERNATIVOS DE RESOLUCION DE CONFLICTOS, INFORME ESTADiSTICO, MEDIACIONES OFICIALES
[MINISTRY OF JUST., NATIONAL ADMINISTRATION OF CONFLICTS RESOLUTION ALTERNATIVE MEANS,
STATIC REPORT, OFFICIAL MEDIATIONS] (no year or page numbers are listed in the document, which
was given to me during my visit to the Ministry of Justice) (on file with author).
68. Unfortunately, there is no complete information regarding disputant satisfaction with the
process or with the settlements; however, the basic consensus regarding the settlements themselves is
that they are almost entirely monetary in nature.
69. An agreement was reached in 13,519 of the total number of cases (34,887), and out of
those 13,519 agreements, 10,677 were given legal status by the Ministry of Labor. Two thousand eight
hundred and forty two of them, it seems, ignored basic legal norms. Therefore, the settlement rate for
this one year time period was 39%, but 2,842 of these were ruled illegal and thus the settlement rate was
ultimately 31%. See Acuerdos Laborales [Labor Agreements], CLARiN DIGITAL, Sept. 16, 1998, at
Economia, at http://old.clarin.com/diario/98/09/16/.
70. The i dividual settlement rates were: 21% in PA, 48% in OK, 59% in TX and 60% in NY.
See JAMES S. KAKAtIK ET AL., AN EVALUATION OF MEDIATION AND EARLY NEUTRAL EVALUATION
UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT (Rand Corp. 1996).
71. Although significantly higher than the Argentine settlement rate, the number of cases in
the U.S. sample is significantly lower: Total cases referred to mediation in 1996 were 100 in NY, 150 in
OK, 300 in TX and 500 in PA. See id. Even if these data were extrapolated to the 3.5-year period
measured in Argentina, the numbers cannot compare to those in Argentina..
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compared with litigation. This increase was balanced out by nearly
identical decreases in the other two programs.72 In keeping with these
numbers, cases referred to mediation took, on the whole, just as much time
to resolve as did comparable cases that were litigated.73
With regard to preventing the supposedly impending collapse of the
judicial system in Argentina, mediation proved capable of resolving
roughly 40,000 cases and diverting even more that would otherwise have
gone to court. Therefore, mediation did save some time for the courts and
reduce the backlog that they are rumored to suffer. The same is evidently
true for the United States districts since they have ad hoc control over their
referral power. If they begin to experience backlog, they need only refer
more cases to mediation. The mechanism is entirely self-regulating and
discretionary.
2. High settlement rates do not imply efficiency for the parties
The figures discussed above also speak to the laws' effects on delays
and costs experienced by disputants forced to attend mediation. Despite
reducing court backlog, mediation in Argentina and the United States dis-
tricts surveyed has served to complicate the plight of 69-70% and 53%,74
respectively, of the cases that come under their jurisdiction. This signifies a
financial and temporal loss for those involved in the dispute and a general
increase in bureaucracy for most participants, especially in Argentina.
Mediation in Argentina might save time and money for the minority of
parties who settle in mediation and reduce the amount of cases heard in
court by at least that percentage (and probably more), but it does not save
time or money for the parties who mediate their disputes in the United
States districts sampled here.75 A significant portion of those cases not
settled by mediation in either country probably do not proceed to court,
since some parties exhaust their financial and temporal resources in arriving
at and participating in the mediation proceedings. Still others may yet reach
settlement after the mediation but before the court date. Such added
bureaucracy is a grave cause for concern in both countries, but especially in
Argentina where poverty is more severe than in the United States.7 6
72. Id. at 36.
73. Id. at 34.
74. These percentages refer to the cases that do not settle in mediation. The inference I draw
is weakened by the possibility that some of these cases settle as a result of mediation, but not during the
mediation session itself. Such tardy resolutions would not be reflected in the data relied upon thus far.
75. See note 79, infra.
76. Consider, for example, that 10% of those employed in Buenos Aires and Gran Buenos
Aires make 110 dollars a month, and 80% of the most recently created jobs are temporary and pay an
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3. Mediation saves money for the courts
The data show that United States courts are saving money-lots of it.
Information such as that which follows would certainly have proven persua-
sive to Argentina and would likely prove persuasive for any other country
contemplating the reception of mediation. Out of the four United States
districts surveyed, the highest total cost per case referred to mediation was
$490, a mere 3-10% of the cost of litigation per litigant, which ranges from
$5000 to $17,000. 7 7 The four districts surveyed refer an average of 360
cases per year to mediation. At the average settlement rate of 47%, 169
cases settle in mediation. Assuming average litigation costs of $10,510 per
litigant, the districts save $1,776,190 per year. In cases that do not settle
and proceed to litigation, the court presumably expends an extra $490
dollars (on top of litigation costs per case). The relevant question, then, is
how many cases referred to mediation must come to an agreement in order
for the courts to save money. Even if a mere 5% of cases settled in media-
tion, the court would save roughly $13,000 per year, despite having to pay
for mediation and litigation costs in the remaining 95% of cases. 7 8 Further-
more, some degree of attrition among cases certainly exists, given the time
and money spent in mediation. Although these calculations do not incor-
porate the cost of setting up and maintaining a mediation program, startup
costs were negligible, averaging just $33,250 (roughly equivalent to the
cost to the courts of litigation for three litigants) in the districts surveyed.
Maintenance costs are unknown, but presumably low.
Despite United States disputants' reasonable statistical odds of reach-
ing a settlement in mediation, the average time and money spent in media-
tion by the parties does not vary significantly from the average time and
money they would spend in litigation. 79 Thus, parties who do not settle in
average of 176 dollars a month. Yet, the cost of living is readily comparable to any major US city. See
Diego Schurman, Grave Situaci6n de los Carenciados: Pobres los Pobres, PAGINA 12, Jan. 11, 1999, at
3, available at http://old.paginal2web.com.ar/1999/99-01/99-01-1 lpagO3.htm (citing data from a work
by the consultant group EQUIPOS DE INVESTIGACION SOCIAL [EQUIS] [SOCIAL RESEARCH GROUPS],
ENCUESTA PERMANENTE DE HOGARES DEL INDEC DEL PRIMER TRIMESTRE DEL AO 1998 SOBRE
DISTRIBUCION NACIONAL DE INGRESOS [PERMANENT SURVEY OF INDEC HOMES OF THE FIRST
TRIMESTER OF THE YEAR 1998 ON NATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME], on national distribution of
income).
77. KAKALIK ET AL., supra note 70, at 39.
78. Five percent of 360 is 18. Avoiding litigation costs in 18 cases translates to a savings of
$180,360 (subtract the cost of litigating those cases - $189,180 - from the cost of mediating them -
$8,820). The cost of mediating the remaining 342 cases is $167,580. $180,360 - $167,580 = about
$13,000 (close enough for my purposes).
79. KAKALIK ET AL., supra note 70, at 34-36 (comparing the median days to disposition and
average lawyer hours in cases mediated in PA, OK, TX, and NY with comparison cases litigated in the
same districts).
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mediation and proceed to litigation expend roughly twice as many financial
and temporal resources as parties who proceed directly to litigation. Some
parties, however, can be expected not to litigate even though they did not
reach an agreement in mediation. Thus, it is economically rational for
United States courts to require mediation as long as the settlement rate plus
the attrition rate add up to at least four or five percent of total cases on the
docket.
If one assumes that the primary goals of the mediation laws are to save
time and reduce backlog, as reflected in the legislative histories, then we
can say that obligatory mediation has been efficient for the courts' pur-
poses. If one assumes, however, that the courts exist to ensure high quality,
efficient justice for the citizens they serve, then the conclusion is not quite
so clear. However, the fact that agreements were not reached in the
majority of cases does not necessarily signify that the process itself did not
help the disputants to understand each other and facilitate a future
resolution to their conflict. Yet, studies suggest this is unlikely.80 In sum,
we are left to ponder the ways in which courts and parties have competing
interests, and to ask whether the optimal balance between those competing
interests has been struck.
4. Courts and parties as actors with juxtaposed interests
The United States calculation exposes the inherent economic tension
between courts and disputants, since a system in which 95% of litigants had
to attempt mediation before gaining access to litigation would impose a
disproportionate temporal and financial burden on litigants. The reality is
of course less disastrous than this, given the forty-seven percent settlement
rate. Given the economic calculus above, however, one must intuit
tremendous good faith to the courts to believe that they would only select
for mediation cases that are likely to benefit from it. The courts' economic
incentives would bode for indiscriminate and plentiful referrals to media-
tion. Argentina's categorical laws exemplify such a scheme.
Even if all cases referred to mediation reached a settlement, however,
this says nothing of the satisfaction of non-economic values-such as, the
quality of justice received, the maintenance of free will, or presence of
externalities, positive or negative, not incorporated into the economic
calculation. These non-economic values surface through an examination of
the mechanisms that produce high settlement rates in both countries.
80. See infra Section IV (B).
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B. Achieving High Settlement Rates
Although the courts in both countries save money even if relatively
few cases are settled, they presumably intend to save as much money as
possible. Their savings increase, of course, in direct proportion to the
number of cases that settle in mediation.
1. Mediator incentives-neutrality lost
In Argentina, the payment schedule governing mediator compensation
provides a powerful incentive for directive mediation-that is, for mediator
behavior aimed at producing a settlement between the parties. The pay
scale for mediators depends both on the amount of money involved and on
whether the parties reach a settlement.8 In the case of settlement, the
82parties split the costs and must pay the mediator at the mediation session.
If the parties do not reach an agreement, the mediator, in order to receive
her pay, must wait until the trial concludes and then present herself to
receive payment from the losing party, who is also responsible for paying
both sides' lawyers fees.83 Mediators may receive a nominal compensation
of fifteen dollars from a special fund established under the law.84 Once the
conflict is resolved through litigation, the mediator has the responsibility to
request payment for the services they rendered sometime in the potentially
distant past. Several mediators commented that they had experienced
problems collecting their fee under such circumstances. On multiple
occasions, I witnessed the mediator counsel parties reluctant to participate
in the mediation that a trial can last years and that a mediated agreement is
in their best interests for that reason alone. Questions of factual accuracy
aside, such advice must be scrutinized given the mediators' financial
interests. And thus, a question arises as to how far mediators are willing to
go to secure participation and settlement.
81. Payment schedules for mediators in the conciliation law are far more neutral. Obligatory
Labor Conciliation Law, arts. 12-13.
82. $150 in suits in which the claim is $3,000 or less, and $300 where the claim exceeds
$3,000. More recently, a third pay scale was added: $600 if the case settles for more than $6,000. See
Decreto del Presidente sobre Mediaci6n y Conciliaci6n [Presidential Decree on Mediation and
Conciliation] Decree No. 1021/95, Dec. 28, 1995, [28301] B.O. 8, at art. 26 (Arg.). That the parties
must pay the mediator at the close of a mediation session that has produced a settlement is established
by article 21.4 of the Mediation and Conciliation Law.
83. Presidential Decree on Mediation and Conciliation, art. 26; Mediation and Conciliation
Law, art. 21.3.
84. Presidential Decree on Mediation and Conciliation, arts. 26 & 28; Mediation and
Conciliation Law, art. 21.
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In the United States districts, mediator pay scales do not bode in favor
of settlement. In fact, the hourly payment scheme in OK85 and TX86 gives
mediators an incentive to prolong the mediations, but is neutral as to settle-
ment. The mediators in NY 87 and PA88 serve pro bono and, therefore, may
seek to dispose of the mediation quickly, whether through settlement or
through encouraging the parties to consider litigation. Only the former is
realistic. A reputation for settling many cases bestows great prestige on a
mediator and it is rational to assume that those who volunteer to mediate
hold favorable views of the process. Therefore, only a modest incentive for
settlement emanates from mediator pay scales in the United States courts
surveyed. Similarly, the fact that in some instances only lawyers are
permitted to mediate does not necessarily imply high pressure on the parties
to settle. 89
A greater source of settlement pressure may be exerted by judges
assigned to the cases that are referred to mediation. The American Bar
Association Model Code of Judicial Conduct states that "[a] judge should
encourage and seek to facilitate settlement, but parties should not feel
coerced into surrendering the right to have their controversy resolved by the
courts." 90 Studies and court rulings suggest that judges routinely overstep
these boundaries in shocking ways, including sanctioning parties for
"failure to settle by a deadline ... [or] make a settlement offer" and issuing
various types of admonitions during settlement talks.9' One study found
that roughly ten percent of judges responding to a survey admit to "'inter-
ven[ing] aggressively-through the use of direct pressure' in settlement. 92
Although a judicial settlement conference is a separate procedure from
mediation, this behavior should raise concerns for how judges manage cases
sent to mediation. Considering that "[c]ourt-connected mediation now
85. PLAPINGER & STIENSTRA, supra note 41, at 235-36.
86. Id. at 273.
87. ld at 200.
88. Id. at 242.
89. See Mediation and Conciliation Law, art. 16. Legal training would ostensibly cause
mediators to frame the conflict in legal, rather than psychological or other terms. It is unclear whether a
focus on legal rights and concrete facts would lead to greater settlement than a focus on underlying
issues. In any case, the mediation training received by all lawyers who become mediators might
counteract this tendency towards legalism to some extent.
90. Commentary to Canons 3A(5) & 3B(8) (2000), cited in Nancy A. Welsh, The Thinning
Vision of Self-Determination in Court-Connected Mediation: The Inevitable Price of
Institutionalization?, 6 HARv. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 64 (2001).
91. Id. at 64-66.
92. See id. at n. 270, citing Daisy Hurst Floyd, Can the Judge Do That? - The Need for a
Clearer Judicial Role in Settlement, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 45, 53-54 (1994).
[Vol. 11:519
Kuhner
often bears 'an uncanny resemblance to the judicially-hosted settlement
conference,' 9 3 it may be viewed as having the same purpose by judges. It
would be possible, for example, before the case entered mediation for a
judge to encourage the parties to settle.
Thus, the politics of judicial expediency have led to mediation pro-
cesses biased by design---especially so in Argentina-which, in turn,
suggests that mediation's facilitative and transformative functions will be
under-represented in practice. Given their incentives, it cannot be said that
mediators in Argentina are neutral. Although not necessarily biased in
favor of one party or the other, their own financial interest necessarily
predisposes them to encouraging settlement, regardless of the terms through
which it is achieved. In the United States, only mild pressures toward
settlement are exerted by mediators, but judges may influence the process
through their relationship to parties and through the act of referring the case
to mediation. If they do not settle in mediation, parties and their lawyers
may feel that they are defying or disappointing the judge who assigned
them to mediation, and, accordingly, that their odds of prevailing in litiga-
tion decline.
Coercion into mediation is one thing; coercion in mediation is
another.94 Mandatory mediation forces the parties to sit face to face and see
whether a basis for an amicable solution exists between them. Although
this may seem superfluous, many parties to a dispute may not have taken
the time or made the effort to see if litigation is necessary. Assuming few
cultural supports for making such an effort, coercion into mediation seems a
valid exercise of legislative power-simply encouraging settlement talks,
but not requiring parties to reach an agreement. Coercion in mediation,
however, goes further. This type of coercion affects free will and may
cause parties to lose sight of their rights or goals, to undervalue the same, or
to be convinced to settle on the basis of exaggerated or false information.
This risk is heightened in situations where coercion by the mediator or
judge exists alongside external factors-such as, corruption and poverty-
that exert pressure in the same direction. Both risks are most severe in
Argentina.
2. Parties' incentives-a Faustian compromise
Does the mediation forum prove conducive to settlement because of
outside temporal or financial pressures? Are rights compromised in
exchange for expediency? This sub-section discusses Argentina almost
93. Nancy A. Welsh, Making Deals in Court-Connected Mediation: What's Justice Got to Do
With 1t?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 787, 796 (2001).
94. Sander et al., supra note 58.
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exclusively, since I have found no factual reports of such factors in the
US-and logically so. Since mediations are confidential and a record of the
proceedings is typically not maintained, reports of actual mediation
dynamics are scarce. Still, concern in the United States districts over such
outside pressures would be misplaced. Mediation often requires as many
lawyer hours and takes as much time as litigation. Also, court congestion is
decreasing. Parties have few incentives to settle in mediation, beyond those
inherent in being sent there by the judge and the prospect of having to
finance mediation and litigation, as opposed to just mediation. In
Argentina, however, mandatory mediations-especially in the labor and
employment context-frequently pit plaintiffs principles against their need
to survive.
Seventy-five percent of all mandatory labor mediations involve the
claim of a fired worker for indemnization by his or her employer.95 Often
times, details of illegal actions are discovered in the mediations, but are not
reflected in the written agreement that becomes public. This, according to a
prominent journalist who requested anonymity, is especially common in
cases involving corporate wrongs in the labor or environmental arena.
Workers bringing suit against companies tend to realize that they would
receive more money in court; however, they also understand that court
proceedings can be delayed years and that such a scenario prevents them
from receiving much needed compensation in the present. When faced with
this dilemma, many opt for an economic compromise: some money now is
better than more money later if one cannot afford to wait.
Cecilia Rico, a full-time mediator and labor conciliator, summed up
the strategic calculation made by employers:
The company tries to get the best deal they can. This is to say
that if they legally owe you $1000, they figure that they can get
you off their back for $300 or so. They're not interested in the
worker, law, or what the worker is legally due. Therefore, I think
that the workers should be able to unite to say that there is
injustice here.
Several cases that I observed brought to light issues of broad import-
such as, under-the-table employment, employee rights, and discrimination
-and the mediated settlements reflected this trade-off of nominal compen-
sation based on necessity, not standards. Under law, a company that
employs a worker "under the table" must pay them an additional 25% on
95. See Acuerdos Laborales, supra note 69.
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top of their indemnization.96 This additional 25%, however, only appears to
be paid when a judgment so orders. "Since the mediation precedes trial,"
Ms. Rico stated, "people usually negotiate and pay the indemnization, but
leave the extra 25% aside." This strategic calculation, present in each of the
fifteen cases I observed, appears to be a function of the additional money
and time required in order to proceed to trial.
Court backlog existed before the mandatory mediation laws. In the
labor context, it is unclear whether mandatory mediation aggravates an
existing deprivation of rights or simply makes an unjust process more
efficient. Another mediator, who spoke on the condition of anonymity,
expressed the latter view:
Before, when the law didn't exist, after a trial had been going on
for about a year, one lawyer would call the other and strike a
bargain. The employee didn't get what he or she deserved in this
process either. They would receive between 50 and 70% of what
they were due. Questions such as working conditions, safety
concerns, etc. are not and were not typically dealt with. Workers
are content just to have a job, but if they do demand better
conditions, they're the first to be let go.
These comments illustrate the different social contexts in which
mediation operates in Argentina and the United States. Although we might
surmise that mediations often settle in the United States for what would
amount to a fair estimation of a court award minus the costs of a full-blown
litigation to the plaintiff, under-the-table employment is not as much a
staple of the United States economy. In other words, though disputes arise
in both countries, I routinely observed that Argentine workers lacked the
financial ability to press forward on a claim, often lacked an attorney,
rapidly agreed to compromise their rights in order to receive in the present a
fraction of what they were legally due, and, even before being fired, had
been denied their rights to employee benefits.
It is doubtful that my observations are unrepresentative of labor
mediations as a whole. The 2,842 agreements denied legal status by the
Ministry of Labor suggests that illegality on the face of an agreement is
common. 97 However, it does not stand to reason that all illegalities will be
reflected in the written agreement. Just the opposite-most parties would
96. Ley de Empleo [Employment Law], Law No. 24.013, Dec. 5, 1991, [LI-D] A.D.L.A. 3873
(Arg.). Under-the-table employment is routine in Argentina. It allows employers to avoid certain taxes
and to forgo offering benefit packages to the employees in question.
97. See Acuerdos Laborales, supra note 69.
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be expected to obscure the illegalities, offering more favorable terms to the
opposing party if necessary to keep their misdeeds off the record.
In sum, mediation exerts some settlement pressure on disputants in
each country by design, although elevated financial pressures on the part of
mediators and parties in Argentina can be expected to add even greater
settlement pressure. Thus far, it is clear that mediation saves the courts
money and reduces their caseload; however, questions regarding mandatory
mediation's more qualitative-and, unfortunately, less measurable--effects
remain. These are examined in the following Section.
V. SOCIAL CHANGE AND MEDIATION'S MACRO CORRELATES
Mandatory mediation in the United States and Argentina belongs to an
institutional change of global proportions. These countries have altered
their dominant mode of dispute processing, placing a consensual, interest-
based newcomer alongside a compulsory rule-oriented pillar of the legal
order.98 From an apolitical legal perspective, a significant structural change
has occurred in the legal architecture. From a comparative perspective, one
observes differing social implications flowing from this changed architec-
ture. Both angles deserve attention.
A. Legal Culture Changes Mediation, Not Vice-Versa
Recall that prominent individuals, instrumental in institutionalizing
mediation or encouraging support for it, made claims about mediation's
value for parties and society, including that mediation would not need to be
mandatory for long.99 Leaving aside the possibility that parties might value
mediation for its ability to apportion quick, albeit low, monetary payments
or to avoid court delays, the question becomes whether mediation is
changing legal culture.
Although legal culture is difficult to measure, the qualitative sense in
both countries is that legal culture is co-opting mediation. A key indicator
of this is that the lawyers are more active in the mediations than the parties.
More than half of the mediators I observed treated the lawyers as primary
participants, relegating the parties to a secondary, less participatory role.
Lawyers not only held a powerful position in determining whether the
clients should accept the result of the mediation proceedings, but in addition
98. Court connected mediation has spread to most countries in Latin America and Europe.
See, e.g., ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION - EUROPEAN COMMISSION, SETVLING OUT OF COURT -
DEVELOPING ALTERNATIVE METHODS TO RESOLVE CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL DISPUTES IN THE EUROPEAN
UNION, at http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice-home/fsj/civil/dispute/wai/fsjcivil-dispute-en.htm (last
visited May 23, 2005).
99. See Highton & Alvarez, supra note 57; Sander et al., supra note 58.
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they exercised influence over the character and direction of the mediations
themselves. The parties' lawyers often argued with each other incessantly
and thus framed the conflict in legalistic, antagonistic terms. In most
occasions, the mediators attempted to involve the parties by asking them
questions directly or informing their lawyers that this process was designed
to encourage party participation. However, with the exception of two cases,
the parties yielded to the lawyers either freely or under pressure. One
mediator repeatedly told me, "it's incredibly difficult to deal with interests
or any other aspect of a conflict beyond positions with the lawyers present."
My observations regarding lawyer influence receive significant support
from Argentine social scientists, including Coleiro and Rojas. They note
that "[i]t frequently happens that the lawyer, as a zealous protector of his
client, attempts to explain to the mediator the facts of the case as if he were
dealing with a lawsuit, thereby suppressing the spontaneity of his client and
the search for his true interests.'0
The same observations dominate United States research on court-
connected mediation:
Recent research suggests that this dispute resolution procedure
increasingly resembles a traditional bilateral negotiation session
between attorneys . . . . Attorneys dominate the mediation
sessions, while their clients play no or minimal roles . . .a
surprisingly small percentage of the settlements produced by
these mediation sessions are creative or even non-monetary.1
01
Thus, mediations often convert into small trials, albeit without the
presence of a judge or jury and without the possibility to set a precedent or
make the proceedings known to the outside world. An important lesson
100. COLEIRO & ROJAS, supra note 9, at 14. These authors continue on to say that "flor this
reason, Bianchi (1996, p. 162) points out that the lawyer should adapt to this new process in which there
is great potential for professional and human development ... in general lawyers are skillful in
developing a defense linked to a given solution or position, and it is possible that they will classify
alternative solutions as right or wrong, or that they will formulate options to which one can only respond
yes or no .... Mediators can reduce the antagonism by treating the lawyers as legal representatives, but
not as prime negotiators." Id.
101. Welsh, supra note 91, at 778-79, citing Deborah R. Hensler, A Research Agenda: Wat
We Need to Know About Court-Connected ADR, DiSP. RESOL. MAG., Fall 1999, at 15, 17 (observing
that anecdotal data and empirical studies "suggest that mediation of civil lawsuits in practice is
evaluative rather than facilitative, and yields distributive outcomes. In other words, court mediation is a
lot like a settlement conference."); Deborah R. Hensler, ADR Research at the Crossroads, 2000 J. DiSP.
RESOL. 71, 76 n.23 (observing that "[i]n a ... review of empirical literature examining court-ordered
mediation practices, [she] found few examples of facilitative mediation of civil damage suits" and was
"unable to identify any significant differences in case outcomes between ... courts that adopted more
facilitative mediation approaches and courts that adopted more evaluative approaches").
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emerges from Argentina and the United States for countries that wish to
adopt a type of mediation that could potentially change legal culture. If
mediation is desired to achieve any benefits besides easing the courts'
financial and caseload pressures, then mediation should be administered in
a more autonomous fashion. To gain more autonomy, several components
would be required: First, mediator pay scales should not increase if settle-
ment is reached. Second, the judge who helps select cases for mediation
should not be the same judge that presides over the case if it goes to trial.
This would prevent parties from feeling that the judge might "take his
revenge" at trial for their failure to live up to his expectations. Third, if
lawyers are to be present at mediation, then the mediator need not be a
lawyer (although it is arguable that any agreement reached should be
scrutinized for legality by an attorney associated with the court). Rights
should be protected at least at a minimum level, but lawyer mediators do
not generally protect rights. Rather, they stress a legalistic view of conflict
that may or may not be responsive to the underlying dynamics---emotional,
financial, relational, etc.-that may fuel the variety of conflicts that come to
mediation. Mediators should be skilled at facilitating communication, not
advocating the virtues of settlement. Fourth, all litigants forced to mediate
should be fully informed of their right not to settle and of the basic ways in
which mediation differs from adjudication. One of these ways is that, given
the confidentiality and non-binding nature of mediation, parties should
know that it is safe for them to take an active role in the mediation, with the
caveat that what they say can help shape the other party's litigation strategy.
There is, however, a competing hypothesis (independent from the
administrative and logistical factors alluded to in the foregoing paragraph)
that responds to the apparent reality that mediation is changing legal culture
less than legal culture is changing mediation. Inadvertently, this hypothesis
provides an answer to the curious fact of inadequate voluntary participation
in mediation, which was pondered by each country's mediation pioneers
and motivated the mandatory mediation schemes.
B. Questions About the Timing of the Remedy and the Nature of the
Disputes
In both countries, mediation is mandated only once a lawsuit has been
filed. Notwithstanding the difficulty or horror of imagining a system where
the government intervened in a dispute before that dispute was brought to
the attention of the state by the disputants, the fact that only mature disputes
are funneled into mediation deserves attention. Although the data are
lacking, it stands to reason that voluntary and meaningful participation in
mediation is unrealistic by the time attorneys have been obtained, a lawsuit
has been filed, and partisan perceptions have flourished. If any community
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mechanisms for or pressures towards settlement existed where the dispute
took place, they would have already been applied without success. The
same could be said of attempts by the parties to reach a negotiated settle-
ment, although if both societies in question are indeed quite litigious, then it
might be the case that such attempts were never made. Regardless, it is the
case that under both systems the parties gear up for a fight, only to be told
that they need to sit down and talk. It is hardly surprising that their dealings
with each other at this point would be infused with legal culture and that
mediated dialogues that occurred would lack the good faith, full participa-
tion (by the parties), and creative problem solving that one wishes to see.
There is an additional reason, however, why creative problem solving
(which mediation is said to facilitate) does not frequently occur. A great
number of the conflicts mediated in Argentina and the United States arise
out of impersonal relationships typical of an industrialized, pluralistic
society. Such conflicts often have a known settlement value-that is, there
have been many such disputes before (auto accidents, for example) and it is
known what they will settle for in court. In this sense, mandatory mediation
applies to fungible and commonplace disputes. Moreover, the lack of
repeat play among disputants in a populous and diverse society suggests
that mediation procedures administered at any point in the lifetime of the
dispute will be met with the adversarial, distributive bargaining characteris-
tic of legal culture. Creative, value-added solutions to conflict are, quite
logically, most feasible and attractive where the parties have an ongoing
relationship. Such a relationship could provide for medium and long-term
benefits from amicable resolution, as well as motivate the resolution of the
underlying factors causing the dispute so that the cost of future disputes
between these same parties could be avoided.
Significantly, the relevant authorities in both countries have failed to
address these factors and have not explained why it makes sense from the
litigants' perspective to mandate mediation. 0 2  Recall that influential
mediation advocates in each country claimed, essentially, that people
simply do not know the benefits of mediation and must therefore be forced
to use it until they (or legal culture generally) come to understand those
benefits. 0 3  The mechanism through which forcing certain litigants to
mediate would change future litigants' or, more generally, society's under-
standing of mediation's benefits was not specified. Perhaps many litigants
forced to mediate will voluntarily mediate their future disputes. Maybe
they will praise mediation's virtues to their friends and colleagues.
102. A possible exception is the Argentine Legislature's reference to the state's inability to
provide justice. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
103. See supra notes 57 and 58 and accompanying text.
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Possibly, after accompanying their clients to mandatory mediation sessions,
lawyers will begin counseling their clients to mediate voluntarily before
filing suit. Despite all these possibilities, only one mechanism through
which mandatory mediation could change legal culture is readily apparent:
economic incentives.
As discussed above, mandatory mediation laws increase the expected
costs faced by parties for submitting their dispute for resolution by the state.
Assuming that citizens of Argentina and the United States are aware of this,
it can be said that mandatory mediation has changed the cost-benefit
calculus faced by anyone contemplating a lawsuit that would fall under the
mediation laws' purview. This altered calculus applies to potential defen-
dants as well as potential plaintiffs, since the former ought to know that if
they fail to resolve the aggrieved party's concerns they will likely be hauled
not only into court, but into mediation as well. Thus, mandatory mediation
provides incentives for increased efforts on behalf of parties to resolve
disputes prior to their entrance into the state's domain.
A strange consequence of this cost-benefit calculation is that the
economic incentive of tax payers not involved in any dispute to intervene
informally (i.e., exert community pressure towards resolution) decreases in
light of the mandatory mediation laws. This is because mandatory media-
tion laws increase the costs faced by disputants and decrease the costs of
judicial administration as a whole. If a perceived likelihood of being a
party to a dispute is widely experienced by most members of a society,
however, then it would be in the interest of all such members to strengthen
community dispute resolution mechanisms. Regardless, however, of
whether both present and future disputants would recognize their heighten-
ed economic interest in resolving disputes prior to submitting them to the
state, the question remains whether economic incentives can translate into
increased efforts at informal dispute resolution. In terms of informal
pressure to settle a dispute prior to filing a lawsuit, it is doubtful that
community members decide to intervene informally in a dispute on the
basis of how many tax dollars will be expended to fund a given dispute's
formal resolution by the state.
In terms of disputants' personal economic incentives, however, it does
follow that an increase in the direct financial costs (as well as temporal
costs) to be born by each litigant would help ensure that the parties attempt
to negotiate before submitting their conflict to the state. In this sense,
mandatory mediation may well respond to the commonly-held but quite
debatable notion that both countries have litigious cultures. What better
way to quell litigiousness than by increasing the costs of proceeding to
litigation?
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The final issues arising in conjunction with mandatory mediation
speak to social change and unintended consequences. These suggest special
risks associated with transplanting mandatory mediation to developing
countries.
C. On Inequality and the Effects of Legal Transplants
No transplanted component of a legal system operates in a vacuum.
Rather, it exists in a particular socio-political context. Mediation in both
countries has been shown to divert cases from the courts and to save money
for the state. Besides these primary, intended effects, researchers in the
United States have suggested that mediation's lack of evidentiary and
procedural rules puts certain types of disputants at risk. Specifically, they
have shown that women, minorities, and any individual bargaining against a
corporation tend to achieve worse outcomes than they might otherwise
achieve in court.'1 4 Professor Nader has suggested that "changes in the
handling of civil cases ... functioned to suppress the realities of class,
gender, and racial antagonisms in the United States, while affording
efficiency and often cheaper dispute resolution for business."'0 5
These risks are increased in Argentina, where ongoing market reforms
are often linked to corrupt practices, windfalls for corporations, and the
general disenchantment of the citizen body. 10 6 Mandatory mediation serves
as a component of economic and social reforms, increasing Argentina's
attractiveness to highly mobile multinational corporations. Mediation is
properly described in these terms since it stresses settlement, confiden-
tiality, and bargaining. These attributes are attractive to corporations,
which are known to value predictability in damages awards and confidenti-
ality in settlement terms. Dominant notions of fairness present in both
countries' legal cultures, on the other hand, might question whether these
values are appropriate in certain contexts, such as where a party is 'right on
the facts and right on the law' 07 -and therefore deserves better than
negotiated compromise--or where an important social principle is at stake.
104. See Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J.
1545, 1600-07 (1991); Laura Nader, Controlling Processes in the Practice of Law: Hierarchy and
Pacification in the Movement to Re-Form Dispute Ideology, 9 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. I (1993)
[hereinafter Nader, Controlling Processes in the Practice of Law]; LAURA NADER, HARMONY
IDEOLOGY: JUSTICE AND CONTROL IN A ZAPOTEC MOUNTAIN VILLAGE (Thorsons Publishers 1991).
105. Nader, Controlling Processes in the Practice of Law, supra note 104, at 5.
106. See, e.g., Jason Morgan-Foster, The Relationship of IMP Structural Adjustment Policies to
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: The Argentine Case Revisited, 24 MICH. J. INT'L. L. 577, 589-
91 (2003).
107. Sander et al., supra note 58, at 892 (asking whether such a person "[s]hould be forced to
run through a number of hoops to settle this case out of economic need").
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Some economically disadvantaged disputants may be amenable to
such terms, given their lack of alternatives, even if they do not receive what
they are legally due. The policy decision inherent in mandatory mediation
is that the state should make that decision for each individual plaintiff. A
suggestion emerging from this comparative analysis is that those exporting
or facilitating the introduction of mediation into new host countries should
consider the extent to which mandatory mediation could worsen existing
power imbalances and decrease already scant protections offered to mar-
ginalized groups. It would also be appropriate for legislatures considering
mandatory mediation laws to contemplate the unintended effects of
diverting cases from litigation to mediation. They might find, for example,
that mandatory mediation relegates due process or equivalent legal protec-
tions from a legal requirement to a discretionary practice. The underlying
lesson is quite simply that the viability of legal transplants needs to be
contemplated with reference to the particular social conditions of the host
country. Similarly, success stories from other countries should not be con-
sidered persuasive without reference to the same.
VI. CONCLUSION
In both Argentina and the United States, a model of mediation has
prevailed that benefits the courts and businesses, and allows disadvantaged
parties to receive some compensation sooner rather than later. No signs of
cultural rejection among disputants could be found. The primary path
dependencies noted in this paper relate to lawyers, legislators, and judges.
Lawyers behave as if mediation were litigation, thereby converting the
mediation into an adversarial settlement conference. Legislators and
judges, not particularly interested in the intangible benefits of mediation-
such as creative outcomes and party empowerment-have legislated and
administered a narrow version of mediation.
A comparative insight arises from this: Countries that institutionalize
mediation via the courts should expect significant co-option of mediation
by adversarial values.10 8 Furthermore, such countries should take care to
minimize the extent to which governmental goals further threaten the
benefits offered by mediation. The extent to which these adversarial values
and governmental goals are shared by (or provide benefits to) citizens
forced to mediate could vary widely and it is this that compromises the
integrity of the process. Accordingly, legislatures considering the passage
of mandatory mediation laws or considering what type of mediation laws to
adopt should think critically about their vision for dispute processing and
108. I am assuming here that the courts of these countries will in fact be steeped in adversarial
values. This of course is not necessarily the case.
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whether that vision accords with disputants' interests and, more generally,
their countries' fundamental concepts of justice. Assuming a well-founded
and coherent vision for dispute processing, attention must be paid to the
potential for divergence between the operation of mediation laws and the
ends those laws were intended to achieve. Here, the means have thus far
proved to be somewhat incongruous with the vision itself, and the vision, in
turn, has not been shown to be well-founded or coherent. It is for these
reasons that scrutinizing the practice of mandatory mediation in Argentina
and the United States has yielded surprising results.
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